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' ial Balloon.
SEC Repression of Effective Advocacy
One of the greatest difficulties of the
litigating attorney is to provide
clients with zealous advocacy in the
face of efforts by some judges, disciplinary boards and others to
r.epress effective advocacy, particularly on behalf of unpopular
clients and causes. Thus, in 1970 the
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties
Law Review noted, "It has become
both professionally and legally
dangerous to be a lawyer representing the poor, minorities, and the
politically unpopular."
There is one further category of
attorneys who should be added to the
roster of those who are in legal and
professional jeopardy.
Oddly
enough, they are the lawyers who
represent clients in the securities
industry.
Previously, in the Ohio State Law
Journal and the New York Law
Journal, I have set forth a catalog of
serious abuses by the Securities and
Exchange Commission of the rights
of those subject to its jurisdiction. Of
even greater concern, however, is the
fact that the SEC has succeeded in
intimidating the attorneys who
appear before it, with the result that
zealous advocacy has been sharply
curtailed in securities matters. As
one highly experienced and highly
regarded securities lawyer commented to me, "The professional
training of the New York securities
bar is to cave in." Another equally
prominent authority said, "The
securities bar has abdicated its responsibilities to its clients in
deference to the Commission."
One indication of the unhealthy
relationship that exists between the
SEC and lawyers who practice before
it is that practically none of the lawyers with whom I have discussed the
problem, including the two quoted
above, was willing to be identified by
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name. However, in each instance in
which I have received information on
a non-attributation basis, I have
been able to confirm the reliability of
that information from at least one
reputable and experienced attorney
who said my information was consistent with his or her experience. In
addition, my previous publications
on this subject have stimulated
numerous letters from experienced
attorneys offering additional illustrations of SEC abuses of power.
Virtually all such letters have
requested that the authors' identities
not be used for fear of retaliation
against themselves or their clients.
The Commission, of course, starts
with the best of motives. It has an
important job to do in the public
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interest, and its members complain
they have been provided with a
"meager" staff with which to achieve
its goals. One way the Commission
has sought to resolve its difficulties is
by insisting that attorneys, in the
public interest, owe a higher obligation to the SEC-a federal agencythan they do to their own clients.
Commissioner A. A. Sommer, in the
January 30, 1974 issue of the New
York Law Journal, characterized
that notion as "revolutionary" and
expressed it euphemistically in terms
of an asserted "public responsibility
• . . to the investing public."

Cop On The Beat
The Commission, for example, has
observed, "This Commission with its
small staff, limited resources, and
onerous tasks is peculiarly dependent on the probity and the diligence
of the professionals who practice
before it." In re Emanuel Fields,
S.E.C. Docket 1, 4-5 n.20 (July 3,
1973). Accordingly, "members of
this Commission have pointed out
time and time again that the task of
enforcing the securities law rests in
overwhelming measure on the Bar's
shoulders." Id. The SEC attorney
has thus become "another cop on the
beat," with the result that "all the
verities and truisms about attorneys
and their roles [are] in question and
in jeopardy." Those insights were offered by Commissioner Sommer in
his New York Law Journalarticle. It
was not an exaggeration, therefore,
when the New York Times referred
to the SEC's practices as constituting
a "major assault" on the adversary
system.
The Commission has succeeded in
destroying the independence of the
securities bar, and in transferring
the attorney's primary allegiance
from the client to a federal agency,

through the use of what SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. has confessed
are "overly crude weapons." In the
same address to a 1973 American
Bar Association meeting, Mr. Garrett explained that the Commission
"keep[s] the pressure on the professionals" to do the government's job
through "suitable incentives." Those
incentives, he conceded, include
"rewards" as well as "punishments."
The rewards consist of favored
treatment of some lawyers in their
appearances before the Commission.
For example, a few attorneys do
receive the opportunity, denied to
others, to appear before the Commission at a critical stage of the
proceedings against some of their
clients. That, of course, creates an
unconscionable conflict of interest
for the lawyers, by putting pressure
on them to trade off the rights of
some clients to curry favor with the
Commission and thereby advance
the rights of other clients. It also
amounts to a denial of the right to
effective assistance of counsel and of
equal protection of the laws to clients
who are not so favored.
The punishments are directed
toward intimidating attorneys into
foregoing zealous advocacy on behalf
of their clients. One attorney,
engaged in vigorous defense of his
client's rights, was advised by a staff
member that he should "take a look
at the National Student Marketifig
complaint." In that case, members
of one of the most prestigious law
firms in the country were named as
defendants in an action by the Commission, in part on the ground that
they had not informed the Commission of possibly incriminating
information that they had received
about their client in the course of the
lawyer-client relationship.
Indeed, an attorney may appear
before the Commission on behalf of a
client and receive no warning that
the attorney is also a target of the
investigation. In one case reported in
the August 10, 1974 issue of Business
Week, a lawyer who was attending a
meeting at the SEC to discuss a
forthcoming investigation of his
client was served with a personal
subpoena within minutes after
refusing to disclose the contents of
conversations he had had with wit-

nesses in connection with his client's
case. In addition, the attorney was
reminded that his "primary duty was
to the Commission, not to the
client." The climate of fear that has
thereby been engendered within the
securities bar has been heightened by
the reminder that an entire law firm
might be disbarred or suspended for
a lapse on the part of a single firm
member-a sanction that is particularly vicious in view of the fact that
disbarment or suspension may result
from simple negligence without any
showing of improper intent. SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., 54 F.R.D. 70
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).

Revealing Comments
One of the most revealing comments that I have heard, illustrating
the unhealthy relationship between
the SEC and the attorneys who practice before it, was provided in a
speech to SEC practitioners by
William L. Cary, a former Commission Chairman and now a
Professor at Columbia Law School.
Professor Cary related that an irate
attorney had once appeared at the
Commission to protest that a staff
attorney had been engaging in
arbitrary conduct toward the attorney's client. With obvious approval and delight, Professor Cary
quoted the staff attorney as saying,
"Listen, if we weren't as arbitrary as
we are, you wouldn't be as fat as you
are." The high-minded moral that
former Chairman Cary drew from
that episode was, "So keep in mind
that your practice depends upon
what the Commission does." Professor Cary then went on to admonish
the attorneys that they have a professional responsibility to "force" their
own clients toward a "process of disclosure."
Perhaps the most dangerous power
of the Securities and Exchange Commission is that of instituting its own
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys whose conduct displeases
members of its staff. There is an
important distinction to be noted, of
course, between disciplinary proceedings that are carried on by an
impartial disciplinary board of the
bar, and those conducted by one's
adversary. When the SEC seeks to
discipline an attorney, it acts, not as
a disinterested third party, but as a
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partisan. It is as if prosecutors had
disciplinary powers over defense
attorneys, or attorneys representing
plaintiffs in personal injury cases
had disciplinary powers over those
representing insurance companies.
We can hardly expect an advocate to
give "entire devotion to the interest
of the client [and] warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his
rights," when the attorney representing the other party has the power
to suspend or disbar that advocate.
Moreover, the situation is made far
worse by the vagueness of the standards imposed by the Commission.
For example, the SEC claims the
power to discipline adversary attorneys on grounds that they are
"lacking in character." 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.2(e). Nor is it fanciful to infer
that such power will be abused. As
Commissioner Sommer conceded in
a speech at the American Bar
Association meeting in Hawaii last
summer, young staff attorneys,
"short on experience, long on
desire," may "very often" find that
the best way to counter skilled
adversaries is through "strong
assertions of authority."
There is doubt that the Commission has the statutory authority that
it claims to discipline attorneys. In
my own view, such power violates
constitutional rights to due process
and effective assistance of counsel.
At any rate, one would at least
expect that the Commission would
exercise that power with restraint.
On the contrary, however, in one
case it was necessary for an attorney
to go to the United States Court of
Appeals to obtain reversal of a twoyear suspension on a charge of
improper conduct five years previously. Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956
(D.C. Cir. 1973). Although the court
ultimately found the Commission's
evidence to be insufficient to support
a finding of impropriety and directed
the Commission to vacate its order
against the attorney, the intimidating effect of such abuses of power is
plain. Indeed, simply for the Commission to commence disciplinary
action against an attorney constitutes, in itself, a severe penalty. As
acknowledged by Commissioner
Sommer in his Hawaii speech, the
Commission "know[s] full well" that
(Please turn to page 38)
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problem confined in space and time.
It represents a combination of illconceived tactics and bad taste
which hopefully will pass.
On the other hand, I feel that the
breaches of civility attributable to
the bench are far more pervasive
and, unfortunately, more enduring.
If the bar is guilty of a consistent
disservice to the court, I suggest it is
the confusion which allows respect to
be replaced by courtship, candor by
obsequity. May I be candid? I have
often seen counsel visit needless
inconvenience upon the court by
tardiness, neglect, irrelevance, lack
of preparation, and, yes, inadequacy. I have been in the ranks. But
in eighteen years of trial practice, I

have never once seen a lawyer act
with intentional discourtesy to a
judge nor impose a calculated
rudeness.
On the other side, I have too often
seen lawyers treated with unjustifiable rudeness and disrespect and
not infrequently humiliated in open
court before client and colleague. I
cannot believe my experience unique.
In his article on judicial intimidation, in the last issue, Leon
Jaworski accented the obligation of
trial counsel to resist the improper
exercise of judicial response. The
problem is that the leaders of the
trial bar-the very ones whose
prestige and ability supports a
capability to respond to such
pressures-are so seldom the vic-

tims, receiving instead the cordialities and respect which they have
earned. Human nature being what it
is, they remain silent.
Surely all understand the pressures
faced by the trial judge and the
irritations he must face in attempting to manage his responsibilities, but there is seldom
justification for the type of rudeness
which we have all encountered or
seen visited upon our unfortunate
brother. It demeans the process, it
subtracts from the whole, and it
erodes the environment of justice.
Respect is by definition a correlative
relationship, and it is the duty of the
trial bar to so state. Upon these
premises, I suggest this issue is more
than "a matter of manners."

ial Balloon
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an injunction action against a
professional can have a "profoundly
adverse effect," very often "far more
profound and devastating" than a
similar action against a business
person.

Further Expansion
Despite that awareness on the part
of the Commision (or, perhaps,
because of it), the SEC has sought to
expand even further its disciplinary
powers and the destructive impact of
those powers. In a proposed amendment to its Rules of Practice, the
Commission has provided that its
disciplinary inquiries should be
made public at the outset. The result
of that action, of course, would be to
damage seriously or to destroy an
attorney's practice, even if the
attorney should ultimately be found
innocent of any improper conduct.
My concern in this article has been
directed, of course, toward the
heavy-handed abuse of its powers by
the SEC against lawyers who practice
before it, and the seriously detrimental effect that such abuse of

power has had, and will continue
increasingly to have, on the lawyer's
role as an advocate in an adversary
system. There is, however, an
interesting postscript to my remarks.
About a year ago, I directed
similar criticisms against the SEC
before the Securities Regulation
Institute, and that address was later
published in my column on Legal
Ethics in the New York Law Journal.
Subsequently, a New York securities
attorney wrote a response, in which
he asserted that my position was
lacking in any factual, scholarly, or
intellectual basis. In replying, I
quoted from a letter to me from SEC
Commissioner Sommer. He referred
to my presentation as "one of the
true highlights" of the program,
urged me "most strongly" to publish
it in a law journal and give him the
"privilege of seeing your thoughts in
print," and concluded, "Again, deep
congratulations for a job extraordinarily well done." It seemed to
me obvious that Commissioner
Sommer would hardly take the
trouble to write such a letter about a
speech consisting wholly of un-
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founded charges, and I said so.
The next development was strange
indeed. Commissioner Sommer
wrote to the New York Law Journal
to complain that my use of his letter
to support my position was "base,
crude and unworthy." (He also
protested that his letter to me was
"personal," despite the fact that it
was typed in a government office, by
a government secretary, mailed in a
government envelope, and written on
an official Securities and Exchange
Commission letterhead.) It is difficult to account for Commissioner
Sommer's abrupt reversal of his view
of my position. If my remarks were,
as he wrote, "extraordinarily good"
and "much too important" to be
limited to the audience at the
Securities Regulation Institute, how
then could they be, at the same time,
wholly unfounded and "irresponsible"?
One possible inference from that
episode is that the Commission is as
intolerant of dissent, or even candor,
on the part of its junior commissioners, as it is of zealous advocacy
by the lawyers who appear before it.

